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PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION AT SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S 
FOCUS ON CATEGORIES OF EVIDENCE  
IN TORGERSON v. CITY OF ROCHESTER 
Abstract: On June 1, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, in Torgerson v. City of Rochester, granted summary judgment for the em-
ployer, the City of Rochester, by holding that the plaintiffs had failed to 
produce sufficient direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. On ap-
peal, the en banc Eighth Circuit categorized plaintiffs’ evidence and asked 
whether each piece, on its own, created a genuine issue of material fact. 
This Comment argues that the court’s preoccupation with categorizing 
evidence distracted it from determining whether discrimination occurred. 
Therefore, courts should adopt the dissent’s totality of the evidence ap-
proach, in which all of the evidence is considered in context when making 
a summary judgment determination. 
Introduction 
 On June 1, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, in Torgerson v. City of Rochester affirmed summary judg-
ment in favor of the City of Rochester, the employer in an employment 
discrimination case.1 The dispute arose in 2005 when the plaintiffs, a 
Native American man and a woman, applied for vacant firefighter posi-
tions but were not selected from the pool of candidates.2 The plaintiffs 
argued that summary judgment should not be granted in “very close” 
employment discrimination cases.3 Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit 
held that summary judgment is always appropriate in employment dis-
crimination disputes and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to pro-
duce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether discrimination occurred.4 
 The court focused on the types of evidence the plaintiffs pro-
duced; first it determined whether there was direct evidence of dis-
crimination, and then it reviewed the proffered indirect evidence.5 
                                                                                                                      
1 643 F.3d 1031, 1036 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
2 Id. at 1036, 1038. 
3 Id. at 1043. 
4 Id. at 1043, 1046, 1052. 
5 See id. at 1043−44. 
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This Comment argues that the majority focused too much on labeling 
the types of evidence presented and, instead, should have performed a 
substantive review of the totality of the evidence.6 In the first part of the 
court’s analysis, it dismissed alleged discriminatory remarks because the 
remarks did not meet the court’s definition of direct evidence.7 Even 
though the remarks were not facially discriminatory, the court should 
have considered them in the second part of its analysis when determin-
ing whether the plaintiffs created an inference of unlawful discrimina-
tion.8 Accordingly, this Comment contends that the court should adopt 
the dissent’s totality of the evidence approach at summary judgment to 
determine whether discrimination occurred.9 
 Part I of this Comment presents the relevant procedural history 
and facts of the Torgerson dispute.10 Part II discusses the Eighth Circuit’s 
categorization of direct and indirect evidence at summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases, describing various approaches to 
making those categorizations.11 Finally, Part III argues that the Eighth 
Circuit should adopt a more holistic review of the evidence to deter-
mine whether plaintiffs present a genuine issue of material fact suffi-
cient to reach a jury.12 
I. The Facts of the Torgerson Dispute 
 In 2005, David Torgerson, a Native American job applicant, and 
Jami Kay Mundell, a female job applicant, each applied for positions 
with the fire department of the City of Rochester (the “City”).13 The City 
hired applicants in accordance with a statutory, civil service process.14 
To earn appointment as a firefighter, applicants proceeded through 
three qualification “Phases.”15 At Phase I and II, applicants took written 
                                                                                                                      
6 See id. at 1055−56 (Smith, J., dissenting); see also Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem 
with Pretext, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 503, 519−22 (2008) (arguing that when courts compart-
mentalize evidence they become distracted from determining whether the totality of the 
evidence supports a finding of discrimination). 
7 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044−46. 
8 See id. at 1055−56 (Smith, J., dissenting); see also Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Infer-
ences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1243, 1255 (2008) (discussing the Su-
preme Court’s use of non-direct evidence as proof of pretext). 
9 Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1056 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
10 See infra notes 13−36 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 37−87 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 88−128 and accompanying text. 
13 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1038. 
14 Id. at 1036. 
15 Id. at 1036−37. 
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and physical examinations.16 If applicants passed the first two Phases, 
they proceeded to Phase III in which they interviewed with a three-
person panel.17 The City scored applicants based on the three stages 
and created a numerically ranked eligibility list.18 Forty-eight applicants 
were certified on the 2005 eligibility list; Torgerson ranked forty-fifth 
and Mundell ranked fortieth.19 
                                                                                                                     
 In late 2005 and early 2006, Fire Chief David Kapler requested that 
the City send candidates for interviews to fill seven vacant firefighter 
positions.20 Three of the positions were funded by Staffing Adequate 
Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grants that required the City, 
to the extent possible, to recruit and hire minority and female fire-
fighter applicants.21 The top nine ranked candidates were certified for 
the Phase III interview.22 Additionally, the City certified three pro-
tected-group applicants, including the plaintiffs, in accordance with 
SAFER grant requirements.23 
 Each applicant met with Fire Chief Kapler for the final interview.24 
Kapler stated that he was looking for “something that might have been 
missed” when interviewing the plaintiffs—attributes that showed they 
were strong candidates regardless of their test scores.25 Despite reach-
ing the final stage, however, neither Torgerson nor Mundell were se-
lected for firefighter positions.26 Kapler explained that both candidates 
were less qualified than their scores indicated; he deemed Torgerson 
an awkward communicator and Mundell not a “standout.”27 
 Concerns arose after the City appointed seven non-protected class 
candidates to firefighter positions.28 A City Council Member investi-
gated the hiring process and asked Kapler why he failed to select pro-
 
16 Id. at 1036. 
17 Id. at 1037. 
18 Id. 
19 Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1038−39. 
20 Id. at 1039. 
21 Id. at 1038. SAFER grant’s “Grantee Responsibilities” section stated: “Grantees, to 
the extent possible, will seek, recruit, and appoint members of racial and ethnic minority 
groups and women to increase their ranks within the applicant’s department.” Id. 
22 Id. at 1037. 
23 Id. at 1039−40. 
24 Id. at 1040. 
25 Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1040. 
26 Id. at 1041. 
27 Id. at 1040. 
28 Id. at 1041. 
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tected-group applicants.29 In response, Kapler stated that he found the 
plaintiffs “unfit.”30 
 After the inquiry, Torgerson and Mundell asserted disparate treat-
ment claims against the City for discrimination in violation of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act.31 Torger-
son claimed discrimination based on national origin and Mundell 
claimed discrimination based on gender.32 Each alleged that impermis-
sible discrimination motivated their unfavorable reviews in Phase III of 
the hiring process.33 The U.S. District Court for the District of Minne-
sota granted summary judgment in favor of the City.34 The plaintiffs 
then appealed to a panel of the Eighth Circuit that reversed the deci-
sion.35 Yet, on rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit vacated the panel 
decision and entered judgment in favor of the City.36 
II. The Eighth Circuit’s Attention to Categories of Evidence 
 Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
landscape of disparate treatment litigation has evolved significantly.37 
In particular, a dynamic area of employment discrimination law con-
cerns summary judgment standards.38 Because discrimination in the 
workplace is rarely documented, plaintiffs face significant challenges to 
proving that they were treated differently than similarly situated co-
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. at 1041−42. 
30 Id. at 1042. 
31 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e to -17 (2006); Min-
nesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01 to .41 (2006); Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 
1031, 1036, 1042. Initially, Torgerson and Mundell filed discrimination charges at the 
Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) and the federal Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042. The MDHR and the EEOC 
dismissed the claims, and Torgerson and Mundell filed suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Minnesota. Id. 
32 Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1036. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary Judgment 
Confusion in Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 Emp. Rts. & Emp. 
Pol’y J. 37, 37−38 (2000) (observing that employment discrimination disputes constitute a 
large portion of federal district courts’ dockets because employment rights affect most 
individuals, and explaining that requirements necessary to prove discrimination have 
changed several times since the passage of Title VII). 
38 See id. at 38−39. 
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workers due to their membership in protected classes.39 As such, Torger-
son demonstrates how evidentiary challenges affect whether plaintiffs 
survive summary judgment in disparate treatment litigation.40 
 In Torgerson, the district court granted summary judgment and the 
circuit court panel reversed; then, the en banc circuit court reversed 
the panel’s judgment.41 These inconsistent outcomes reflect the confu-
sion among district and circuit courts considering disparate treatment 
allegations at summary judgment.42 The threshold question is whether 
there is a separate standard of review at summary judgment for em-
ployment discrimination cases.43 Then, assuming discrimination cases 
are treated like other cases, courts must determine the types and 
strength of evidence required for the case to reach a jury.44 
 The plaintiffs in Torgerson argued that summary judgment should 
be used sparingly in employment discrimination cases because evi-
dence of discriminatory animus often remains with the defendant.45 
Nonetheless, the en banc court abrogated prior Eighth Circuit case law 
and firmly stated that summary judgment is appropriate for all actions, 
including discrimination actions.46 
                                                                                                                      
39 See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1982); Ware, su-
pra note 37, at 39; Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Frame-
work: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 
983, 1005 (1999). 
40 See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1046, 1052 (8th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); Ware, supra note 37, at 39; see also Phyllis T. Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow 
of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. Rev. 
211, 232 (1992) (noting that a plaintiff’s inability to access a defendant’s subjective state of 
mind “makes it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to prevail”). 
41 Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1036. 
42 See Green, supra note 39, at 985; see also Thomas F. Kondro, Comment, Mixed Motives 
and Motivating Factors: Choosing a Realistic Summary Judgment Framework for § 2000e-2(m) of 
Title VII, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. 1439, 1439−40, 1449 (2010) (discussing the circuit split con-
cerning the types of evidence required for § 2000e-2(m), or mixed-motive discrimination, 
claims). 
43 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043. 
44 See id. at 1043−44. 
45 See id. at 1043; see also Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 
2010) (holding that summary judgment should be used sparingly in employment dis-
crimination cases as it is an improper remedy in “very close” cases). 
46 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043 (explaining that prior Eighth Circuit panel statements 
asserting higher summary judgment standards in employment discrimination cases none-
theless resulted in the affirmation of summary judgment, and that, in several instances, 
panels granted summary judgment for the employers); Ware, supra note 37, at 43; see also 
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (holding that Title VII disputes should be treated just as any other 
question of fact). 
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A. Evaluating Disparate Treatment Claims at Summary Judgment 
 Although in Torgerson the Eighth Circuit held that summary judg-
ment was procedurally proper, courts in disparate treatment employ-
ment claims apply a specific framework established by two seminal Su-
preme Court cases.47 First, in 1973, the Supreme Court, in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, devised the first summary judgment framework 
unique to Title VII disputes.48 Under this framework, plaintiffs may rely 
solely on circumstantial evidence to create an inference of discrimina-
tory motive.49 The Court reasoned that facially biased remarks in the 
workplace rarely occur, recognizing that circumstantial evidence en-
sures plaintiffs of their day in court.50 Second, in 1985, the Supreme 
Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston clarified its prior holding, 
stating that if plaintiffs prove intent with direct evidence then the 
McDonnell Douglas test does not apply.51 
 An important dichotomy emerged from the Trans World Airlines 
clarification: the framework applied at summary judgment differs de-
pending on whether plaintiffs produce circumstantial or direct evidence 
of discrimination.52 Direct evidence proves discrimination on its face, 
prompting the court to move on to review any asserted affirmative de-
fenses.53 But, in the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff must unpack 
the employer’s adverse decision to reveal a discriminatory motive.54 In 
effect, by creating different frameworks for summary judgment, the 
Court predicated a plaintiff’s success on a court’s categorization of the 
plaintiff’s evidence as direct or indirect.55 
B. Direct Evidence v. Indirect Evidence 
 Three definitions of “direct evidence” emerged from the circuit 
courts in disparate treatment cases.56 The differences, however, may 
                                                                                                                      
 
47 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804−05 (1973); Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043−44. 
48 See 411 U.S. at 804−05; see also Tymkovich, supra note 6, at 503 (discussing the 
McDonnell Douglas framework). 
49 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804−05; see also Green, supra note 39, at 985 (ex-
plaining that the McDonnell Douglas framework relies on circumstantial evidence). 
50 See Trans World Airlines, 469 U.S. at 121 (explaining its reasoning in McDonnell ). 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. at 121−22. 
54 See Tymkovich, supra note 6, at 505. 
55 See infra notes 56−77 and accompanying text. 
56 See Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 581−82 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating 
that circuit courts apply three different definitions of direct evidence); Kenneth R. Davis, 
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continue to shift as the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa is interpreted by the lower courts.57 In Costa, the Court held 
that the jury was entitled to an instruction that any evidence may be 
used to show that discrimination was a motivating factor in an adverse 
employment action.58 At its narrowest, Costa applies only to jury in-
structions in cases in which a plaintiff claims discrimination was one of 
several motivations underlying the employment decision.59 Yet, creat-
ing a circuit split, some courts have suggested that Costa’s holding may 
apply at summary judgment as well, effectively replacing the McDonnell 
Douglas framework.60 
 In the midst of this confusion, the circuit courts continue to ana-
lyze the distinctions between the three types of direct evidence.61 The 
first, traditional approach describes direct evidence as “evidence that 
proves a fact at issue without the need to draw any inference.”62 Here, 
the evidence must be a statement by a decision-maker made at the time 
                                                                                                                      
Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 
31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 859, 878−81 & n.98 (2004). 
57 See 539 U.S. 90, 91 (2003); Michael Heise & David Sherwyn, The Gross Beast of Burden 
of Proof: Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment Discrimination 
Outcomes, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 901, 916 (2010). For example, some commentators have noted: 
The relevance of McDonnell Douglas after Costa has been hotly debated in 
courts and numerous law review articles. The debate is heated and complex 
because the schemes are not the result of any thoughtful coherent policy. In-
stead, they arise out of layered case law analyzing Title VII, the [Civil Rights 
Act] of 1991, and the other discrimination statutes. There has never 
been Congressional action addressing the issue or a Supreme Court opinion 
deciding whether the two systems can still co-exist. 
Heise & Sherwyn, supra, at 916−17. 
58 See Costa, 539 U.S. at 91. 
59 See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
Costa decision refers to jury instructions and does not extend to summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases); see also Heise & Sherwyn, supra note 57, at 916−17. 
60 See Heise & Sherwyn, supra note 57, at 918−19. The Sixth Circuit no longer applies 
McDonnell Douglas to mixed-motive cases at summary judgment; instead, it asks whether the 
adverse action was motivated by discrimination. Id. at 918. The Fifth and Second Circuits 
adopted a modified-McDonnell Douglas test that allows plaintiffs to present either evidence 
of pretext or motivating-factors. Id. The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits strictly apply McDon-
nell Douglas at summary judgment. Id. The Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits allow plaintiffs 
to argue their case using either the McDonnell Douglas or Costa framework. Id. at 919. As of 
2010, the remaining circuits have no clear rule on the matter. Id. at 919; see also Kondro, 
supra note 42, at 1447−55, 1458−59 (discussing the circuit split after Costa). 
61 See Heise & Sherwyn, supra note 57, at 916 (explaining that in 2008−2009, every fed-
eral circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas framework). 
62 See 1 Charles A. Sullivan & Lauren M. Walter, Employment Discrimination 
Law and Practice 93 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the traditional definition of direct evi-
dence as applied in the circuits); Davis, supra note 56, at 878−79. 
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of or with regard to the adverse employment action.63 Thus, a remark 
by someone with hiring authority, such as “I did not promote [the can-
didate] because [the candidate is] black,” would constitute direct evi-
dence.64 
 Under the second approach, direct evidence includes remarks that 
reflect a discriminatory attitude, even if those remarks are not proxi-
mately tied to the adverse employment action.65 For example, in 2004, 
in DiCarlo v. Potter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
that a decision-maker’s derogatory statements about a postal worker’s 
national origin made three weeks prior to the worker’s termination suf-
ficed as direct evidence.66 
 Finally, the most liberal approach defines direct evidence based on 
the quality or strength of the proof.67 The Eighth Circuit adopted this 
liberal definition, holding in Torgerson that direct evidence refers to evi-
dence that shows a strong causal link between an adverse employment 
decision and impermissible discriminatory motives.68 Under this ap-
proach, direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are not opposing 
terms.69 Instead, direct evidence of a discriminatory motive can include 
“strong” circumstantial evidence that is not subject to a McDonnell Doug-
las analysis.70 The remaining circumstantial evidence that does not 
point “clearly” to discrimination is categorized as indirect evidence that 
can only be used to create an inference of discriminatory motive.71 
 Applying its liberal, direct evidence definition, the en banc court 
in Torgerson analyzed two pieces of evidence to determine whether they 
                                                                                                                      
63 Sullivan & Walter, supra note 62, at 93. In some instances, non-statements, such 
as a head nod, in affirmation of a remark may constitute direct evidence. See id. at 93 
n.170. 
64 Davis, supra note 56, at 879. 
65 Sullivan & Walter, supra note 62, at 95 & n.175. 
66 See 358 F.3d 408, 417 (6th Cir. 2004). 
67 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044; see also Sullivan & Walter, supra note 62, at 95 (ex-
plaining that direct evidence relates to “the quality of the proof rather than the kind”). 
68 Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044 (holding that “direct evidence is evidence ‘showing a spe-
cific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, suffi-
cient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually 
motivated’ the adverse employment action” (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 
111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997))). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. The court explained: “A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that illegal dis-
crimination motivated the employer’s adverse action does not need the three-part McDon-
nell Douglas analysis to get to the jury, regardless of whether his strong evidence is circum-
stantial.” Id. 
71 Id. 
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constituted direct evidence.72 First, the plaintiffs established that City 
Commissioner Roger Field said he would not have taken the SAFER 
grants had he known that it required hiring protected-class appli-
cants.73 Although the Eighth Circuit used the broadest definition of 
direct evidence, the court was doubtful that the Commissioner was a 
“decision-maker,” and held that, even if he were, the remark did not 
demonstrate discriminatory animus because the law does not require 
preferential treatment for minority applicants.74 Second, the plaintiffs 
showed that City Commissioner John Withers, a hiring decision-maker, 
selected an applicant because he was a “big guy and that he’d make a 
good firefighter.”75 Again, the panel rejected the remark as direct evi-
dence because the statement was not made with regard to Mundell; 
rather, the remark was made in reference to another applicant.76 In 
sum, the proffered evidence failed to meet the threshold of direct evi-
dence, and, importantly, the panel disregarded this evidence through-
out the remainder of its analysis.77 
 Without direct evidence, the plaintiffs turned to the McDonald 
Douglas three-part test that, if satisfied, permits an inference of unlawful 
discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment.78 Under this 
test, if the plaintiffs state a prima facie case, then the defendant must 
proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action.79 
The burden then reverts to the plaintiffs, who must then demonstrate a 
genuine issue of material fact that the defendant’s stated reason is mere 
pretext for unlawful discrimination.80 In Torgerson, the parties satisfied 
the first two elements.81 Therefore, the plaintiffs had to meet their 
stage three burden of proving that the City’s proffered reason for not 
hiring them was pretextual.82 
                                                                                                                      
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044−45. 
75 Id. at 1045. 
76 Id. at 1046. 
77 See id.; id. at 1056, 1058 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
78 See id. at 1044 (majority opinion) (explaining that all indirect evidence is subject to 
the McDonnell Douglas test). 
79 Id. at 1046. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the hiring 
process if the applicant can show that the applicant was (1) in a protected class; (2) quali-
fied for the open position; (3) denied that position; and that (4) the employer filled that 
position with a person who was not in the protected class. Id. 
80 Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1046. 
81 See id. at 1047. 
82 Id. 
10 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
 Pretextual evidence refers to indirect, circumstantial evidence that 
shows, through inferential reasoning, that a discriminatory reason 
rather than the proffered “legitimate” reason actually motivated the 
employment decision.83 Examples of pretextual evidence are statistics 
on hiring practices, comparisons of applicants’ qualifications, or prior 
treatment of an employee.84 To prove pretext in Torgerson, the plaintiffs 
pointed to (1) their qualifications as applicants, (2) the subjectivity of 
the hiring process, (3) the different standards used by the Fire Chief in 
interviewing the protected-class applicants, (4) the Fire Chief’s refer-
ence to the plaintiffs as “unfit,” and (5) the hiring of five males the year 
after the challenged hirings.85 The panel rejected the evidence as insuf-
ficient proof of pretext, indicating that the plaintiffs were not similarly 
situated to the hired firefighters because they ranked below the se-
lected applicants on the eligibility list.86 Therefore, without a showing 
of direct or indirect evidence, the plaintiffs failed to create a genuine 
issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment.87 
III. Courts Should Adopt the Totality of the Evidence Approach 
 The majority opinion in Torgerson shows that plaintiffs’ success at 
summary judgment depends on whether they can accurately identify 
the strength of their circumstantial evidence and not whether discrimi-
nation occurred.88 The Eighth Circuit applies the broadest test for di-
rect evidence, indicating that even circumstantial evidence can be di-
rect evidence if it is “strong.”89 Plaintiffs benefit from such a liberal test 
because outright discriminatory remarks are uncommon and direct 
                                                                                                                      
83 See id. 
84 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804−05; see also Sullivan & Walter, supra note 62, 
at 122−25 (analyzing methods used in Supreme Court cases of proving pretext); Tymkovich, 
supra note 6, at 512−15 (discussing types of pretext evidence in disparate treatment litiga-
tion). 
85 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1047. Plaintiffs can establish pretext in a variety of ways, 
such as by showing (1) that an employer’s justification lacks credibility because it has no 
factual basis or (2) that an illegal reason, as compared to the stated reason, more likely 
motivated the adverse employment action. Id. 
86 See id. at 1049−52. 
87 See id. at 1052. 
88 See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1055−56 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Smith, J., dissenting); Tymkovich, supra note 6, at 519−22 (arguing that courts, by com-
partmentalizing evidence, focus on categorizing evidence even while ignoring the evi-
dence in its totality). 
89 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044. Compare Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1038 (Shephard, J., con-
curring) (arguing that the Eighth Circuit should not incorporate circumstantial evidence 
within its definition of direct evidence), with Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132, 1135−36 & n.3 
(8th Cir. 2007) (holding that circumstantial evidence may constitute direct evidence). 
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evidence, on its own, creates a genuine issue of material fact.90 Yet, this 
benefit backfires when plaintiffs overestimate the strength of their cir-
cumstantial evidence.91 If an alleged discriminatory remark, offered as 
direct evidence, does not clearly reflect discriminatory motive, then 
that evidence is not considered again in the McDonnell Douglas analy-
sis.92 This Comment argues that such an approach is unfair to plaintiffs; 
therefore, courts should adopt the totality of the evidence approach.93 
 In Torgerson, Judge Lavenski Smith, dissenting, argued that all cir-
cumstantial evidence, regardless of strength, should be analyzed as evi-
dence of pretext, and that the majority’s fixation on categories of evi-
dence diverted the court’s attention away from the ultimate issue: 
whether there was sufficient evidence of discrimination.94 The remarks 
pertaining to the SAFER grants’ requirements and the hiring of a “big 
guy” may not expressly reveal discriminatory intent.95 Yet, even if the 
statements were not direct evidence, the remarks should inform the 
pretext analysis.96 As Judge Smith noted, a reasonable person could 
infer that Commissioner Field was “opposed to hiring women and mi-
norities under any circumstance, mandatory or otherwise”; in contrast, 
the majority assumed that the Commissioner disagreed generally with 
mandatory hiring requirements.97 Further, Commissioner Wither’s “big 
guy” comment expressly referenced gender; this might be interpreted 
at trial as his favoring male over female firefighters.98 
 The Supreme Court has cautioned against a compartmentalized 
analysis like that used by the Eighth Circuit in Torgerson.99 For example, 
in 2000, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Court empha-
                                                                                                                      
90 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985); U.S. Postal Serv. 
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1982) (noting that a plaintiff rarely has 
eyewitness testimony as proof of an employer’s mindset). 
91 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1056−58 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that the direct evi-
dence offered created disputed issues of material fact as to whether the City’s proffered 
reason for not hiring Torgerson and Mundell was pretextual). 
92 See id. at 1055. 
93 See infra notes 94−128 and accompanying text. 
94 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1055−56 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
95 See id. at 1056−58. 
96 See id. at 1055, 1058; Zimmer, supra note 8, at 1255 (arguing that “direct, direct-lite, 
or circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the three” can be used to prove pretext). 
97 Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1056 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
98 See id. at 1058. 
99 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152−53 (2000); 
Tymkovich, supra note 6, at 519−20; Zimmer, supra note 8, at 1254−55; see also Michael 
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Doug-
las?, 53 Emory L.J. 1887, 1907−08 (2004) (noting that, in Reeves, the Court held that non-
direct evidence should still be considered as proof of pretext). 
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sized that judges should consider all of the evidence when making a 
summary judgment determination and should not treat the evidence in 
isolated categories.100 In Reeves, the Supreme Court found that the Fifth 
Circuit erroneously discredited ageist remarks that did not meet its 
definition of direct evidence.101 The Supreme Court reasoned, how-
ever, that non-direct evidence may still be persuasive evidence that 
shows that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretex-
tual.102 Further, by not considering the ageist remarks for the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis, the Fifth Circuit supplanted its judgment for that of 
the jury.103 Thus, to prevent judges from usurping jury functions, the 
Reeves Court instructed lower courts to analyze plaintiffs’ evidence in its 
entirety.104 Such an instruction seems particularly relevant in the 
Eighth Circuit because of the vague distinction separating direct-
circumstantial from indirect-circumstantial evidence.105 
                                                                                                                     
 The Eighth Circuit’s focus on types of evidence should be set aside 
in exchange for what Judge Smith termed the “totality of the evidence” 
approach.106 Under this test, which is consistent with Reeves, direct and 
indirect evidence can be used as proof of pretext.107 For example, if the 
court reconsidered Commissioner Field’s remarks regarding the SAFER 
grants as indirect evidence, the focus would shift away from his status as 
a decision-maker.108 Instead, the court would consider whether a jury 
could reasonably infer from his statement that Field harbored discrimi-
natory animus.109 The totality approach shifts the court’s attention away 
from a strength test and allows unfettered analysis on the ultimate ques-
tion of whether discrimination occurred.110 
 To persuade courts to send questions of discrimination to the jury, 
practitioners should argue that their circumstantial evidence is relevant 
as direct and indirect proof of discrimination.111 In Torgerson, the plain-
tiffs’ attorney attempted to avoid the direct-indirect divide by arguing 
 
100 See 530 U.S. at 152−53. 
101 See id. (holding that the ageist remarks were not made in relation to the plaintiff’s 
termination). 
102 See id. at 153. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. at 152−53. 
105 See id.; Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1044. 
106 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1056 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
107 See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 153; Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1055−56 (Smith, J., dissenting); 
Tykomovich, supra note 6, at 519; Zimmer, supra note 8, at 1254−55. 
108 See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152−53; Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1056 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
109 See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152−53; Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1056 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
110 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1055 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
111 See id. at 1055−56. 
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that summary judgment should be used sparingly in employment dis-
crimination disputes.112 The court firmly rejected this position.113 
Therefore, rather than trying to dispose of summary judgment gener-
ally, practitioners should rethink the pretext prong of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis.114 Specifically, after the employer proffers a reason for 
its adverse action, a plaintiff’s attorney should argue that the evidence 
should be considered in its entirety.115 Accordingly, the most egregious 
remarks and more nuanced statements would be analyzed together as 
evidence of pretext.116 By framing the evidence in its totality and plac-
ing it in context, a plaintiff’s attorney can more effectively establish a 
genuine issue of material fact.117 
 Finally, the totality approach is fairer to plaintiffs than the ap-
proach adopted by the Eighth Circuit.118 The McDonnell Douglas Court 
recognized the limitations faced by plaintiffs who lack clear proof of 
discrimination.119 Allowing procedure to overshadow the substance of 
the evidence diminishes the benefits of McDonnell Douglas.120 Further-
more, the procedural approach taken by the Eighth Circuit majority in 
Torgerson leads to two disadvantages: losing relevant evidence to classifi-
cation schemes and losing control over the big picture.121 Under a 
compartmentalized approach, not only must plaintiffs produce in-
criminating evidence, but they must also accurately predict the proce-
                                                                                                                      
112 Plaintiffs-Appellants Reply Brief with Supplemental Addendum at 15, Torgerson, 643 
F.3d 1031 (No. 09-1131). 
113 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043. 
114 See Tymkovich, supra note 6, at 521 (arguing that courts should consider the evi-
dence in its totality rather than divide the presentation of evidence into stages under the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis). 
115 See Laina R. Reinsmith, Proving an Employer’s Intent: Disparate Treatment Discrimination 
and the Stray Remarks Doctrine After Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 55 Vand. L. 
Rev. 219, 255 (2002). 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 255−56. 
118 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1055−56 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
119 See Reinsmith, supra note 115, at 229 & n.63. 
120 See Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 313, 344 (2010). “It is precisely 
courts’ misuses of procedure in conjunction with their treatment of Title VII’s substantive 
requirements that have endangered the pretext element of McDonnell Douglas, reducing 
it to be nearly meaningless in the totality of plaintiffs’ proof.” Id. 
121 See id. (noting that it is unclear what types of evidence are sufficient to survive sum-
mary judgment); see also Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After 
Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229, 2324 (1995) (maintaining that “evidence takes its meaning 
from context”). 
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dural preferences of the judges.122 Torgerson shows that judges will dis-
regard evidence in its entirety if categorized improperly.123 By focusing 
on evidentiary procedure rather than the substance of the evidence, 
judges can manipulate genuine issues of material fact and take cases 
away from the jury.124 In contrast, under the totality approach, any rele-
vant evidence of discrimination must go to the fact finder.125 At trial, 
plaintiffs can present the sum of their evidence with live testimony.126 
Then, after hearing the evidence in context, jurors can determine 
whether the employer’s decision not to hire a protected-class applicant 
was motivated by discriminatory animus.127 This is what Title VII in-
tended.128 
Conclusion 
 The ultimate question in Torgerson is whether impermissible dis-
crimination motivated the hiring process. The majority answers this 
question by compartmentalizing the plaintiffs’ evidence and asking if 
each piece on its own created a genuine issue of material fact. If the 
plaintiffs’ categorized a remark as direct evidence and it failed as proof 
of discrimination on its face, then that evidence was not reconsidered. 
Under this approach, plaintiffs are forced into a guessing game: they 
must determine if their circumstantial evidence is strong enough to 
survive as direct evidence. In Torgerson, the plaintiffs guessed wrong 
and, as a result, their case was dismissed. The mechanics of the sum-
mary judgment framework distracted the Eighth Circuit court from 
determining whether discrimination motivated the hiring process. 
Therefore, courts should adopt the totality of the evidence approach. 
Under this approach, all of the plaintiffs’ evidence would be analyzed 
                                                                                                                      
122 See Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1225 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., 
concurring) (questioning why failed “direct evidence” is abandoned prior to the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis); Martin, supra note 120, at 344. 
123 See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1046. 
124 See Martin, supra note 120, at 334. The Reeves Court warns lower court judges that they 
are not to, “(i) [M]ake credibility determinations, (ii) weigh the evidence, or (iii) draw infer-
ences from the facts.” Id. (interpreting Reeves); see Reinsmith, supra note 115, at 255. 
125 See Reinsmith, supra note 115, at 255. One author argues that judges should not 
engage in credibility determinations; rather, they should consider whether proffered evi-
dence is relevant to and probative of discrimination. Id. If so, the evidence should be sub-
mitted to the jury, so long as its probative value outweighs any concerns of prejudice. Id. 
126 See Martin, supra note 120, at 400. 
127 See Reinsmith, supra note 115, at 255. 
128 See id. at 255−56. 
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to determine if the defendant’s proffered, nondiscriminatory reason 
for not hiring them was pretextual. 
Allison Berman 
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